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Negative theology and meaningless suffering 
 
Abstract: This paper attempts an exploration of the limits of our capacity to weave suffering 
into patterns of meaning. I try to show that something like an apophatic moment in our 
response to some kinds of suffering is both necessary and difficult to sustain. From this 
emerges a question about the relationship between this ‘something like apophasis’ before 
suffering, on the one hand, and unknowing in face of the mystery of God, on the other. I 
argue against a tendency in some modern theology to elide one into the other-- against a 
tendency to absorb the ‘mystery of suffering’ into the ‘mystery of God.’ The paper 
concludes with the suggestion that in order to avoid such an elision, and other forms of false 
reconciliation with suffering, Christian theology needs to maintain a commitment to a 
future-oriented eschatology, a real –if unimaginable-- eschatological hope. 
 
Keywords: Suffering, Apophatic Theology, Impassibility, Passibility, Eschatology, Hope, 
Mystery 
 
Something like an apophatic moment in our response to some kinds of suffering is 
both necessary and difficult to sustain. In what follows I will try to explain this claim, make a 
case for it, and explore its significance.1  
The words ‘something like’ play a serious role here. The aim of what follows will be 
to propose a comparison of one thing, the sense of bafflement, the experience of running 
up against the limits of what we can say and know in relation to some suffering, with 
another thing, the ‘unknowing’ of God-- and not to propose an identification of the two. The 
relationship between them, however, bears exploration, as does in particular the 
temptation to elide the one with the other.  
In relation to this symposium’s theme, my aim is not to explore how Christian 
theology, as negative theology, is able to bring distinctive gifts to the political domain, but 
something more modest. The aim is to develop an understanding of how Christian thought, 
                                                     
1 I am grateful to the sisters of Congregation of La Retraite—Ireland UK, whose support for study leave facilitated the 
writing of this paper, and whose conversations underpin some of the thinking within it, even if in ways which might not 
immediately be apparent. I am also grateful to those who have heard or read the paper and probed its logic, including 
colleagues at the Rome Symposium, colleagues and students in the Durham Theology and Ethics Seminar, Paul Murray and 
Susannah Ticciati. They have helped in a variety of ways, even if I have not been able to rise to all of the challenges they 
raised. 
 2 
when properly “negative,” limited, “apophatic”2 in relation to suffering, can avoid some of 
the political pathologies into which it might otherwise be drawn.3 
What follows is deliberately framed in terms of reflection on the broad and vague 
category of suffering rather than as a reflection on tragedy, or trauma, or disability, or the 
Holocaust4, even though in connection with each of these there is a more readily available, 
already well stocked, philosophical or theological conversation. All of these conversations 
have some bearing on what I will be reflecting on here, but none of them can quite provide 
the context for the somewhat general reflections I will attempt here.  
I  
A first approach to the theme—the necessity of something like an apophatic 
moment in our response to suffering-- is by way of contrast: I will begin with consideration 
of a theological reflection on suffering where the “apophatic” moment, or “apophatic” 
sensibility, is missing. 
Thomas Weinandy’s Does God Suffer? is an important and valuable book. It makes a 
case against passibilism (the thesis that God suffers) which is clearly ordered, carefully 
argued, and comprehensive. It offers readers a thorough grasp of the “new orthodoxy” of 
passibilism, of the ways in which it is unsuccessful in what it sets out to do, and the ways in 
which it entails a really radical, wide-ranging revision—and also misapprehension-- of a 
traditional understanding of God. It serves as the definitive critical examination and rebuttal 
of modern passibilism. 
In the final chapter of Does God Suffer?, however, the same clarity, order and 
comprehensiveness which are such positive features of much of the book seem to lead it 
astray. On my reading, at least, this chapter –“Suffering in the Light of Christ,” -- strikes a 
false note in relation to the concrete experience of suffering. The reader who reaches this 
final chapter might even start to feel the pull, after all, of passibilism—if the approach to 
human suffering set out here is really the only alternative. 
                                                     
2 In what follows, I will use quotation marks around ‘apophatic’ in order to avoid a too frequent repetition of the 
cumbersome ‘something like apophatic’.  
3 Paul Murray construes systemic theology as a discipline which, among other things, diagnoses and seeks to cure 
pathologies within the life of the church. Whether or not I am exactly fulfilling his understanding of the task of theology 
here, I am influenced by his formulations.  For a full account of Murray’s understanding of theology, see, inter alia, 
‘Engaging the Church’ in Mike Higton and Jim Fodor, eds, The Routledge Companion to the Practice of Christian Theology 
(London: Routledge, 2014). 
4 It seems necessary to use the word ‘Holocaust’ here, in spite of its well-known problems, simply because it is the term 
around which ‘post-Holocaust’ theology has coalesced. 
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Weinandy’s aim in the chapter is to examine “the meaning of all human suffering in 
the light of the gospel”5. Its first part is devoted to two general truths: first, that “all who 
suffer are united, to a greater or lesser extent, to the risen Christ”6; and secondly, that the 
risen Christ, as head of the body of the Church, is suffering in the sufferings of all who 
suffer: ‘While Jesus is gloriously risen, and thus beyond sin and death and so evil, yet as 
head of his body which is still suffering under the constraints of sin, evil, and death, he too, 
as the head, is still, in some real sense, suffering.’7  In the second part of the chapter, 
Weinandy then turns to ‘some specific types of suffering and the various Christian 
responses to them.’8 Here we find four subsections: we suffer as a result of our personal sin; 
we suffer as we ‘groan’ in the difficult process of struggling to be set free of our personal 
sin; we suffer as the Father disciplines and educates us, in tests and trials, enabling our 
spiritual growth and the display of our ‘true metal’; and we suffer as a result of the sins of 
others. There are in each case proper Christian responses: the suffering caused by our 
personal sin should trigger repentance; in our groaning, we must continue to fight the good 
fight, not lose heart, and take consolation from the fact that Christ groans with us and our 
groaning is not in vain; in trials and tribulations we should respond with ‘courage, patience, 
fortitude,  and love,’9 standing firm without fear and in hope; when suffering stems from 
someone being sinned against, we must forgive and we must act to remove evil that causes 
suffering, even at the cost of making ourselves vulnerable to those who do evil. 
Weinandy’s theme of union in suffering with the risen Christ is interesting, if a little 
elusive.10 It is the second half of the chapter where a problem emerges. And even here 
there is no particular proposal put forward by Weinandy that could lightly be denied by a 
Christian theologian. Every component in his subdivision of the sources of suffering and the 
appropriate responses to it is anchored in Biblical texts, and is set out in a way consonant 
                                                     
5 Weinandy, Does God Suffer (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 244. The sentence in fact continues on to a second half: ‘and 
more specifically the Christian experience and interpretation of human suffering from within the context of sharing in 
Jesus’ death and resurrection.’ As I read it, this ‘more specifically…’ is not intended as an indication that Weinandy intends 
to offer something less than, something more restricted than, an account of ‘the meaning of all human suffering in the light 
of the gospel.’ The ‘more specifically…’ is rather as an indication of the shape his understanding of ‘the meaning of all 
human suffering’ will take. It does not, in other words, diminish the scope and ambition of the chapter, which is to examine 
the meaning of all human suffering. 
6 Ibid., 246, emphasis omitted. 
7 Ibid., 252. 
8 Ibid., 262. 
9 Ibid., 270. This list is embedded in a description of that which we admire in others as they face affliction and hardship. 
10 Weinandy himself is aware of its elusiveness: ‘I must admit that this is a mystery that I am not sure I fully understand, 
not in the send of comprehending it, for no Christian mystery can be fully comprehended, but in the sense that I don not 
even know fully what the mystery is’ (252, n18). 
 4 
with, and recognizable from, tradition. And in connection with each of these components, 
there are situations where using his analysis and adopting the response he commends may 
well be exactly the right thing to do.  
The problem is not, then, with what Weinandy says, but with what he fails to say, 
and what he fails to say in particular about the limits of the relevance and reach of what is 
set out. The positive, confident quality of the chapter’s language is nowhere 
counterbalanced by any suggestion that there might be some kinds of suffering for which no 
account of a purpose can be found, which go beyond our capacity to explain or find 
meaning in. Weinandy gives the impression of offering a map of the terrain, with the kinds 
of suffering, the meaning and significance of the various kinds, and the desired ways of 
responding laid out.11 He does not claim to be absolutely comprehensive, but he writes as 
though knowing his way around this territory, so that one might expect anything not already 
covered to require only a slight addition to or elaboration of the ‘framework’.  
One does not have to think very hard or look very long to come upon situations 
where this framework begins to be inadequate. In the case of a bereaved parent, who loses 
a child to, for instance, climbing accident or illness, the reader will immediately be able to 
rule out three of Weinandy’s four categories—their suffering is not principally caused by 
their personal sin, nor by the ‘groaning’ of their efforts to overcome sin, nor by someone 
else’s sin. So it can only, it seems, within his framework, belong in the trial and testing 
category. Now, while it may not be false to say that in her suffering the parent has the 
opportunity to display courage, patience, etc., or that her suffering can be the means to 
‘heroic sanctity,’ it seems a distraction from, an evasion of, the reality of the situation and 
what is most pressing in it, to bring these points to the fore. More generally, the language in 
which Weinandy frames his analysis, language of offering an ‘adequate and realistic 
description and explanation’12, of understanding the causes and meaning of suffering, of the 
‘many, and often inter-related, purposes’ it serves, all seems ill-fitting, inappropriate, in 
relation to a case like this. Particularly disturbing is the way in which throughout his 
discussion of this sub-category of suffering, Weinandy keeps returning to the biblical 
                                                     
11 Weinandy does make reference to John Paul II’s Salvific Doloris and its characterisation of suffering as a mystery, but he 
moves quickly from this reference to his broad explanation of the types of suffering. The ‘mysterious’ quality of suffering 
does not actually play any role in his thought; it is given no weight in his exposition. 
12 Ibid., 262. To be fair, Weinandy is really only claiming to offer something that is ‘more adequate’ than that offered by the 
passibilists. But overall his is a rhetoric of confidence; it is not balanced by, say, any suggestion that it might still overall 
remains more inadequate than adequate, or by any questioning of whether adequacy is in fact possible. 
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language of discipline: his framework seems to suggest that in relation to suffering which 
does not come under one of the other three sub-categories (consequence of personal sin, 
side-effect of the struggle to be liberated from sin, consequence of the sins of others), we 
have no choice but to reflect on the nature of divine discipline. 
Thinking about his framework in relation to the Holocaust—something the book in 
some sense actively invites—is particularly unsettling. Weinandy has, earlier in the volume, 
named the Holocaust as the ‘icon’ of suffering for our time: part of his argument in this 
chapter is that the consistent focus on the Holocaust and other examples of unjust suffering 
of the innocent which characterizes the thought of passibilists leads to an oversimplified 
understanding of suffering, for suffering is not, as a matter of fact, always caused by 
injustice. On his map, nevertheless, the Holocaust and other instances of unjust suffering 
still retain a place—they are to be understood as a subset of the kinds of suffering caused by 
the sin of others. Once again the language shaping his discussion—the language of 
understanding the meaning, of adequate and realistic description and understanding, of the 
multiple purposes served by suffering, sits very uncomfortably next to the recollection of 
genocide or mass torture and murder; so too does the particular explanation Weinandy 
offers, in this subsection, of the value and meaning of this general category of suffering 
(‘Without minimizing the evil and the suffering that it causes, to be sinned against provides 
the victim an opportunity to respond to such evil in a godly manner, and so to grow in 
holiness…To be sinned against and to be suffering because of this sin, always calls forth, 
from within a Christian perspective, a proactive virtuous response.’)13  
What is missing in this chapter, then, is any sense of bafflement before suffering, of 
being silenced by it, brought to the end of what can be explained; there is no attention to 
the limits of the applicability of the explanations of purpose and meaning that are set out. 
As a result, though each of the individual claims Weinandy makes may be defensible, there 
is something untruthful about them, taken together as a whole.  
                                                     
13 Ibid., 273. The points I am raising against Weinandy are in some ways similar to the kinds of objections that can be and 
have been made against, for instance, the theodicy of Richard Swinburne. It does not follow, however, that the 
fundamental problem with Weinandy is that he is offering a theodicy, since this is something he does not claim to do. His 
goal is to give a theological map of the experience of suffering, general patterns for thinking about and responding to it, 
rather than to offer an argument to justify God’s goodness and power in the light of this experience. Like the tradition on 
which he draws, he never toys with the possibility of calling God’s goodness and power into question. So while it may be 
that there are disturbing resonances with Swinburne, these need to be understood within a framework broader than that 
of ‘theodicy.’   
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There is one point where Weinandy himself comes close to a recognition of this. To a 
sentence which explains that the chapter will be rather long because he wants ‘to address 
the actual lived experience of people,’  he adds the note ‘It must be remembered that, while 
I wish to be as practical and concrete as possible, what I say about the Christian experience, 
interpretation and response to evil and to the suffering that it causes does not in any way 
imply that Christians, within their own hearts and minds, experience, interpret and respond 
to such suffering in this manner’14.It seems as though the drive to have a settled ‘answer’ to 
suffering leads Weinandy to assemble a framework about the experience of suffering which 
he knows is not true to actual experience.15  
 
II 
The final chapter of Does God Suffer can, in my view, serve as a case study in what 
goes wrong when an apophatic dimension in our response to suffering is missing. But of 
course one cannot establish the need for an apophatic moment on the basis of such a case 
study. Even a reader who accepts that there is something problematic in Weinandy’s 
framework for analysing the varying purposes and meanings of suffering might ask how I 
can know that the problem couldn’t be solved by adding on an extra category or two. It is 
necessary to approach the theme a little more directly, offering a reflection first on the 
place of speech and thought within suffering, and then on the limits of speech and thought 
towards suffering. 
 Consider, first of all, pain. Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain is a speculative and wide-
ranging book, but what has particularly caught the interest and attention of most readers 
seems to be the discussion in the first few pages of the resistance of physical pain to capture 
in language. Scarry makes a convincing case that a ‘resistance to language is not simply one 
of [pain’s] incidental or accidental attributes but is essential to what it is,’ and indeed that 
‘pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it’.16 It is not absolutely 
impossible to talk about pain, but it is difficult, and developing the capacity to talk about 
                                                     
14 Ibid., 244, n4, emphasis added.  
15 Weinandy might of course respond that the lack of fit between actual Christian experience of suffering and the Christian 
experience of suffering he describes is simply the result of the inadequacy, or immaturity in the faith, of actual Christians. 
This might be taken to be the implication of the final sentence of his footnote: ‘How to experience, interpret and respond 
to evil, and the suffering that it causes in a Christian manner can itself be a life-long, and often unfinished process’.  
16 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 5, 4. 
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and communicate to others the nature of pain is already to begin to diminish its ‘aversive’ 
quality. 
 Scarry’s attention is focused very specifically on physical pain, and not all suffering is 
pain. Indeed, we probably incline too much to take pain as the fundamental paradigm of 
suffering.17 Nevertheless, something like what Scarry says of pain is frequently true more 
generally. Serious suffering is often associated with a difficulty of speech, and of thought. It 
is likely to disrupt a person’s projects, to interfere with their sense of themselves, with their 
ability to narrate their life, either forward or backward. It is not necessary to adopt a general 
theory of the progress of all suffering—something, as I will discuss below, which sometimes 
happens in the literature of practical theology-- but in many contexts it seems to be the case 
that suffering comes with an element of disruption to the understanding, and that even the 
capacity to name the suffering, to name it as suffering or in some more specific way, 
provides a hint of alleviation, a certain improvement in the situation. If I am feeling 
miserable, and can give the misery a name --‘Ah, so this is homesickness’ -- there is often 
already, somehow, a certain lightening; in medical contexts, it can be a relief to have a 
diagnosis, even when no treatment is possible. And beyond the sense of relief that a name 
brings, there seems for many to be an instinct to search for a broader pattern within which 
the suffering can be placed. This may be a broader pattern of intelligibility--I understand 
what I am going through as rooted in distinct causes, whether in my genes or in something 
that I or someone else did in the past. Or it may be a broader pattern of value --terrible as it 
is, I can see good coming from this suffering, some growth or deepening or new possibility.  
 So far, I have not in fact given any reason to support the importance of an 
‘apophatic’ dimension in response to suffering: just the reverse. Very often, it seems, to the 
degree that one can escape the dimension of the ‘apophatic’, one is better off—suffering is 
in some sense diminished. If, to consider another common example, I am suffering a 
depression and can name the depression as a depression, I will often be already a little 
better off than if I suffer it without knowing what it is. And if I can understand it as a 
predictable consequence of a series of factors (genetic inclination combined with namable 
                                                     
17 Eric Cassell’s writings are interesting on the relation of pain and suffering and have become classics in the field. (See, for 
instance, the article entitled ‘The nature of suffering and the goals of medicine,’ The New England Journal of Medicine 306 
(1982): 639-45, and the book of the same title published by Oxford University Press in 1991. However, because Cassell 
begins from medical practice, he still tends to work from a presumption that suffering is always somehow rooted in pain or 
other physical distress, even as he argues so effectively that suffering cannot be understood only in terms of pain and 
physical distress. 
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environmental stressors, say), there is likely to be a certain reassurance in this. And if I can 
understand it as attached to something good—it is the price I pay for a particular sort of 
creative work, say, or it will fund my capacity to reach out to other people in certain ways—
there is also an element of consolation (perhaps only retrospectively) here. So while the 
depression in itself, this experience of suffering, may press towards inarticulacy, any 
progress I make in naming, in understanding, in weaving it into a broader understanding, 
including an understanding of that which I most value, seems to help. What is most needed, 
on this view, is not maintaining the moment of apophasis, but escaping from it. 
 But this weaving of suffering into larger patterns, especially patterns of value—
seeing good in it, or good linked to it—is, to make a rather obvious observation, not always 
possible. True, many give accounts of the experience of grace amidst suffering, the 
occurrence of growth in and through suffering, the deepening of relationships to God and 
others through suffering—in some ecclesial contexts there is a strong tendency to turn any 
discussion of suffering in these directions18. But however seriously we listen to such 
accounts, it is not possible to derive from them a law, whether of nature or of Christian 
experience.19 Suffering clearly often leads to more suffering, diminishing a person rather 
than ennobling them, destroying relationships rather than deepening them.  
 It is because there is not always a tale of the experience of grace or growth or 
greater intimacy in suffering that the possibility of an ‘apophatic’ response to suffering on 
the part of the one who suffers is important. ‘This is terrible, and, in spite of what I believe 
about God working for the good in all things, I can’t see any good attached to it 
whatsoever.’ Such an unresolved and in a sense uncomprehending attitude is not easy to 
sustain; there are social, cultural and ecclesial pressures to know what it is all about and to 
have something positive to report in relation to suffering. And yet without the possibility of 
such an unresolved, uncomprehending attitude, the believer is forced into a range of 
distortions in their relationship to their faith and to the reality of their situation. 
                                                     
18 It is worth noticing that to say one of these things—that I had a particular encounter with grace in the midst of my 
suffering, or I grew through it, or grew closer to others—is not necessarily to say that the suffering was therefore 
worthwhile, that its occurring was justified by being such an occasion for this grace or growth. In my experience people 
often point to what can be said of a positive nature without any hint that they are thereby balancing an equation, without 
any implication that ‘therefore it was all worth it, after all.’ If there is an element of consolation in being able to say one of 
these things, in witnessing in some way to the goodness of God in the midst of suffering, there is not necessarily therefore 
a justification of suffering.  
19 The fundamental flaw in Eleanor Stump’s Wandering in Darkness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), it seems to me, 
is that, for all its complexity, sensitivity and creativity, she does seem to think she can move from certain such narratives to 
a general law, a general principle. 
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 So far I have been venturing a variety of claims about the place of speech and 
thought within suffering. But if the possibility of not-knowing within suffering is important, 
still more is the need for restraint of speech and knowledge towards suffering-- something 
like an apophatic moment in the face, not of ‘my’ suffering, but yours, or hers, or theirs. 
Restraint of speech and knowledge are not, of course, the first thing that comes to mind in 
relation to the suffering of others. First there is the question of what I or we do to alleviate 
suffering, and to address its causes, both of which make a range of requirements on our 
powers of understanding. But what of the suffering for which we know no cure, or before 
which to one degree or another we are powerless? Here, I’d like to suggest, the role for 
something-like-apophasis, the requirement of a limitation to our speech and thought, is 
broader than in the case of the sufferer herself, because there are some kinds of meaning-
making, or meaning-finding, which can legitimately be done in relation of ‘my’ suffering but 
not ‘yours’ or ‘his’. The process of finding some way to be at least partly reconciled to 
suffering, of fitting it into a larger pattern of value, of discerning grace and growth met 
within suffering, is for the most part not one we can properly undertake in the second or 
third person.20  
 This something-like-apophasis in the face of the suffering of others is difficult. We 
don’t really want to know about suffering which we can neither eliminate nor absorb into a 
larger story with a satisfying shape. We are inclined to avert our attention, either by simply 
looking away, or by trying to nudge the suffering into a story whose shape gives comfort.21 
Such a pattern of response is frequently reported in everyday interactions by those who 
suffer chronically or traumatically,22 but it also has analogues on a more abstract, 
                                                     
20 Cf. my ‘Eschatology, Suffering and the Limits of Theology’ in Christoph Chalamet and Andreas Detweiler, eds, Game 
Over?: Reconsidering Eschatology (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017) for a more extended exploration of the differing 
first, second and third person relationships to suffering and meaning. One thing I miss, at times, in Rowan Williams’ rich 
and thought-provoking recent book, The Tragic Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), is an attention to this 
kind of distinction.  So, for instance, on the first page, Williams writes ‘we are not simply passive in the face of terror and 
suffering, because we can imagine it, narrate it…’ Presumably a great deal depends on who the ‘we’ are here. Presumably 
there are indeed forms of terror and suffering which reduce their victims to passivity, which may, for those whom they 
strike, shut down the imagination, cut off the possibility of narration. 
21 A fuller exploration of this theme would also include consideration of situations in which those in an apparently ‘third 
person’ relationship to suffering have a role in, or an entanglement with, the cause of the suffering.  The awareness, 
conscious or unconscious, of complicity—that, say, the material ease of my life is linked to systems which cause large scale 
suffering in distant parts of the world or in other parts of my own society—can lead people in different directions, the most 
frequent of which is probably towards an even stronger instinct to avert attention, or to nudge a story into a comforting 
shape. I am grateful to Linn Tonstad for pointing to this lacuna in my analysis. 
22 So, for instance, Susan Brison, a philosopher who writes about her experience in the aftermath of a murderous assault 
and rape in Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) describes the 
initial anger she feels with those amongst her family and friends who don’t want to know about her experience, implicitly 
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theoretical level. The practice of theodicy is the most obvious of these analogues: the 
theodicist aims to find a way of thinking so that all suffering can be understood as woven 
into a larger pattern of meaning and value. Theodicy has been routinely rejected by 
systematic theologians in recent years, and while some of the motivation for this rejection is 
historical (many theodicies seem to seriously misread the theological tradition) and 
‘theological’ in a strict sense (often theodicies operate with a crude, abstract and deist 
understanding of God), in significant part the animus against theodicy is ethical—it has been 
ultimately I think, an objection to making meaning from, and thereby being reconciled to, 
other people’s suffering. 23 
 Theodicy is only one way, in any case, of succumbing to the temptation, at a 
theoretical level, of averting attention from suffering by weaving it into a pattern whose 
shape we find more comforting, more acceptable. A second way is to suppose that one has 
within one’s grasp a general technique, a kind of algorithm, for processing suffering and 
coming out the other side. This seems to be a temptation to which some pastoral and 
practical theologies are susceptible. Dorothee Sölle, for instance, tells us of a Phase 1, a 
Phase 2, and a Phase 3 of suffering, and even provides a chart under which the three phases 
are analyzed according to twelve different features.24 Pamela Cooper-White, in the entry on 
suffering in the Wiley Blackwell Companion to Practical Theology, does not speak explicitly 
of phases or present a complex table, but she nevertheless offers what seems a confident, 
almost diagrammatic, analysis of pain, suffering, trauma and healing: pain, on her account, 
is mute, whereas suffering is already expressive. Therefore, she writes ‘For healing to take 
place fully, we must make meaning in relation to our pain…’; or again ‘pain—especially pain 
that exceeds transient physical pain—must actually be transformed into suffering for holistic 
healing of mind, body, and spirit to occur.’25 Trauma results from a dissociation which blocks 
this process, and for which there is in turn a specific solution. The pastoral worker has a 
                                                     
deny its gravity, blithely assume she’ll recover in a matter of a few weeks--an anger which affects her until she learns that 
this is an absolutely standard phenomenon in the face of the trauma of others. 
23 It is worth noting that on the view I am sketching here, it would be a mistake to be too sweeping in the dismissal of 
theodicy. Any attempt actually to answer the problem of evil, actually to provide a theodicy, is on my view problematic for 
the reasons just indicated. But it is not a mistake to raise the theodicy question, or at least close cousins to it--it is not a 
mistake to be troubled, puzzled and uncomprehending in the face of evil and suffering in the world, to have questions for 
which one both desires and lacks answers. (This is a point I argued at more length in ‘Evil and the Limits of Theology’ (New 
Blackfriars 84 (2003), 13-29). 
24 Dorothee Sölle, Suffering (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1975). 
25 ‘Suffering’ in Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, ed, The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Practical Theology (Oxford: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2014). 
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definite place in this analysis-- Cooper-White’s concludes with a summary: ‘By standing as 
witnesses who offer deep recognition of one another’s pain, we participate in a holy process 
of transforming mute pain into expressive suffering. Through the shared comprehension of 
such suffering, transformation becomes possible—healing and renewal for a broken 
world!’26 There may well be a good deal of pastoral experience and wisdom condensed into 
these formulations, but I am not sure I would want, in my moment of distress, to talk to 
someone in possession of such a tidy knowledge of how it all works, of what must be done 
and what will heal me, nor am I convinced that Cooper-White’s confidence, and her 
generalizations about the healing process, could be deployed in the face of large scale 
horrors. 
 We can have trouble, then, I am suggesting, in our ordinary concrete encounters in 
attending to suffering without forcing it into a pattern of meaning to which we have no 
right; and we have analogous trouble, on a theoretical level, in acknowledging a suffering 
which we cannot in some way weave into a larger pattern of meaning. We have seen two 
examples of the latter, more theoretical difficulty, and in the next section we will come 
across a third, and one which is, for my purposes, the most interesting. 
III 
 I have thus far been discussing something like an apophatic moment or dimension in 
response to suffering, or using quotation marks around ‘apophatic’. But what in fact is the 
relationship between this ‘something like’ and the real thing? 
 An obvious objection to the comparison I have been making—to the possibility of 
the comparison being any use whatsoever—derives from a point of which Denys Turner has 
steadily reminded us, namely that apophatic theology is not all about having nothing to say 
about God. It is instead about the acknowledgement, the recognition, of the failure of all 
language, an acknowledgement and recognition that needs to be accomplished as much 
through a profusion and piling up of language about God as through its negation.  
 But some echo, some analogy, to the cataphatic/apophatic dialectic is, I think, in fact 
present in our relationship to suffering. There is, in a second or third person encounter with 
suffering, a need to attend, to take interest, to wish to understand, to understand as much 
as we can, as well as a necessary failure in this. A visitor to Rwanda ought not say, ‘Oh, well, 
                                                     
26 Ibid., p.30. 
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I am never going to be able to understand what it was like to live through the genocide, so 
no need to try to learn or listen;’ we have to both try to understand, and in the trying, 
encounter and not evade the failure.27 
In the first person encounter with suffering, too, it might be possible to trace some 
sort of analogy with the cataphatic/apophatic dialectic. One might think of lament, a theme 
widely present in current pastoral literature on suffering. To the situation I have described 
earlier in this paper, where a believer suffers without finding she can truthfully speak the 
familiar words about hidden grace or growth or spiritual deepening, a standard response 
coming out of recent pastoral literature might be ‘Yes, this is why it is so important that the 
church recovers the language of lament, the language of the psalms and of Job, of complaint 
to and before God.’ And though lament is sometimes imagined, `as in work of Sölle and 
Cooper-White, as a ‘Phase 2,’ a step along the way to a resolution, it does not need to be: it 
can also simply be understood as the flip side, the wordy, articulate side, of the not-knowing 
which I have been discussing. The speeches of Job offer an example of intense articulacy 
which serves to underline a fundamental situation of not knowing. 
Nevertheless, in spite of whatever suggestive similarities can be found, my aim is not 
to propose that the ‘something like apophasis’ before suffering is in fact the same thing as 
our ‘unknowing’ of God-- that the mystery of suffering, to put it another way, is 
mysteriously identical to the mystery of God. What I’d like to suggest, to the contrary, is 
that the absorption of the one into the other is the last and in some ways most dangerous 
temptation for an evasion of our actual situation before suffering—it is itself a temptation 
towards a false reconciliation with suffering. 
                                                     
27 It is an oversimplification, of course, simply to say that we must attend to and try to understand suffering. I do not mean 
to propose that there is a universal ethical requirement that everyone always has to pay as much attention to everyone 
else’s suffering as possible. No doubt there are times where I am entirely justified in skipping over distressing pages of the 
newspaper to read a soothing article about baking. It is unnecessary for the sake of my argument to propose a set of 
criteria for determining when in particular we do and when we do not have the obligation to attend to the suffering of 
others. Indeed, there may be kinds of attention to the suffering of others which are wrong and intrusive. The two things 
which I am presuming are, first, that we do at times have an obligation to attend to the suffering of others, at times even 
when we are not able directly to alleviate that suffering; and secondly, that such attending is difficult. 
 The Rwandan authorities have placed genocide memorials at a range of locations-- usually sites of massacre--
around the country. These do not exist primarily for the sake of foreign tourists, but a touring visitor, such as I was in 2015, 
does face a recurring challenge—ought I stop and visit this one? For those who come to Rwanda from places such as the 
US or France or Belgium there is an extra dimension,insofar as they belong to a group which bears a share of guilt for the 
genocide or the failure to avert it, but I suspect that even without such an element of responsibility there would be 
something amiss in visiting Rwanda and refusing any attempt to understand what happened in 1994.  
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Consider for instance Simone Weil’s well-known essay ‘The Love of God and 
Affliction.’28 Here Weil depicts a particular kind, or style, or intensity of suffering,29 which 
she terms malheur and which has become ‘affliction’ in translation. It is, as she describes it, 
beyond consolation. It includes physical pain, from which the one afflicted cannot escape; it 
includes social degradation; it rules out solidarity30 and, short of a miracle, any form of 
human compassion; it submerges the soul in horror. Affliction ‘stamps the soul to its very 
depths’ and the one afflicted feels scorn and disgust towards themselves, self-hatred, guilt 
and defilement. it is not something from which one really recovers (‘even a person who has 
come through his affliction will still have something left in him compelling him to plunge 
into it again’). 
Affliction is in a sense unthinkable—the afflicted ‘have no words to express what is 
happening to them’31, and others can bear to consider affliction only from a distance. It is, 
according to Weil, ‘the great enigma of human life’32: we can have some understanding of 
why suffering is allowed, which can in fact be educative, part of a training, of a spiritual 
practice, in attuning ourselves to the beauty of the world and its obedience to God.33 But we 
cannot understand affliction in such terms, for it is too thoroughly destructive: ‘At the very 
best,’ Weil writes at one point, ‘he who is branded by affliction will keep only half his soul.’34 
We have, then, a portrayal of a kind of suffering which diminishes and destroys and 
dehumanizes, and of which no one can say that this is good or conducive to growth.  But at 
a certain moment in the essay there is a kind of flip, a reversal, so that that which is worst 
suddenly reveals itself as the best, the highest possible participation in what is good above 
all. Love, Weil maintains, expresses itself in two modes, closeness and distance. The love of 
God for God in the Trinity therefore requires not only unimaginable union but also an 
infinite distance, a maximal separation, which we find in the relation of Father and Son 
through the affliction and abandonment of Christ on the cross. We, as embodied creatures, 
cannot share in this life in the Trinitarian love as closeness, so our highest possible 
                                                     
28 Simone Weil, ‘The Love of God and Affliction’ in Waiting for God (New York: Harper Colophon, 1973), 117-36. 
29 Given the deliberately broad way suffering is being used in this paper, Weil’s ‘affliction’ counts as a kind of suffering, 
even though within the context of the essay she defines affliction by contrast to ‘mere’ suffering.  
30 ‘As for those who have themselves been mutilated by affliction, they are in no state to help anyone at all, and they are 
almost incapable of even wishing to do so’, Ibid., 120. 
31 Ibid., 120. 
32 Ibid., 119. 
33 Ibid., 131-2. 
34 Ibid., 120. 
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participation in it is at a distance, as affliction35: ‘our misery gives us the infinitely precious 
privilege of sharing in this distance placed between the Son and his Father’36  
In an essay like this Weil can be compelling, beautiful, moving and at the same 
time—for many readers-- deeply disturbing.37 Of course, it might be objected, this is already 
something well-known about Weil, and in any case however one might think of her, she will 
not be counted a mainstream Christian theologian.  What is interesting, however, and what 
makes a consideration of Weil significant in this context, is how often the pattern set out so 
powerfully and so clearly in this essay can also be discovered lurking somewhere in those 
who are indeed mainstream Christian theologians.  
The similarity between Weil’s position and that of Hans Urs von Balthasar would not 
be hard to establish—in fact the Trinitarian similarities are quite striking-- but because I 
have already written about Balthasar on suffering elsewhere38, I will turn here to an essay 
by Karl Rahner entitled ‘Why Does God Allow us to Suffer?’39  
Just as Weil begins with a description of affliction which seems to block off our 
capacity to be reconciled to it, removing grounds for easy consolation, so Rahner begins 
with an exploration of the failure of theodicy, showing that all efforts familiar either from 
tradition or from contemporary thought to answer his question -- why God allows us to 
suffer --are inadequate. He considers the suggestion that suffering is simply to be accepted 
as the side effect of an evolving world, the friction generated by the particular version of 
finitude in which we find ourselves. This cannot account for the immense suffering resulting 
from sin: ‘Responsibility for the march into the gas chambers of Auschwitz cannot be spread 
                                                     
35 ‘Even the distress of the abandoned Christ is a good. There cannot be a greater good for us on earth than to share in it. 
God can never be perfectly present to us here below on account of our flesh. But he can be almost perfectly absent from 
us in extreme affliction. This is the only possibility of perfection for us on earth’, Ibid., 127. 
36 Ibid. 
37 So, for instance, she writes of the way the force, the shock, from a hammer blow is concentrated into the point of a nail, 
and moves on to imagine what happens if the hammer and the nail are infinitely large, though the point of the nail remains 
sharp. Affliction is then ‘a nail whose point is applied at the very center of the soul…a marvel of divine technique…a simple 
and ingenious device which introduces into the soul of a finite creature the immensity of force, blind, brutal, and cold. The 
infinite distance separating God from the creature is entirely concentrated into one point to pierce the soul in its center’, 
Ibid., 134-5. She then moves onto an analogy with the struggles of a ‘butterfly pinned alive into an album’, Ibid., 135. 
38 Cf. Chapter 5 of Balthasar: a (very) critical introduction (Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2012) and ‘Julian of Norwich, 
Hans Urs von Balthasar and the status of suffering in Christian theology’ in New Blackfriars 2017 (currently only available 
online: https://doi.org/10.1111/nbfr.12298). 
39 Rahner and Balthasar are not, it should be said, the only two possible options here. If space and the patience of readers 
were unlimited, the focus might open out to what is most fundamentally implied in the link which passibilists make 
between suffering and divine love; to the treatment of suffering in St John Paul II’s Salvifici Dolores; and to the recent 
argument Linn Tonstad has made about the way suffering and death are imported into the Trinity by thinkers such as 
Graham Ward and Sarah Coakley. Cf. Linn Tonstad, God and Difference: the Trinity, Sexuality and the Transformation of 
Finitude (New York: Routledge, 2016).  
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over the phenomena leading to the plunge of a swarm of migratory ants into an abyss. Evil 
is not merely a complicated case of what is biologically unpleasant or of death prevailing 
everywhere’.40 Can suffering then be accounted for as the consequence of our freedom, or 
that of other creatures (e.g. angels)? However true this may be, it doesn’t offer a real 
answer: there is still the question of why God allows creaturely freedom to go wrong, 
because ‘even our free decision as such is…in every respect and in its whole reality 
dependent on God’41. He is clear that what in an Anglo-Saxon context is termed the free will 
defense is impermissible in Christian theology: it is a ‘basic conviction of all Christian 
theology that to regard our freedom in this way as absolute and autonomous is contrary to 
the Christian understanding of God.’ And where the free will defense takes three pages to 
dispense with, the traditional answer that suffering is ‘a situation of trial and maturing’ 
takes only one: ‘there is infinitely diverse, terrible suffering in the history of 
humanity…which cannot be integrated into a process of maturing and personal probation.’ 
Rahner suggests, without entirely endorsing, the judgment that ‘only a fraudulent and 
unrealistic piety’ could see the suffering of our world in this way,’ that only ‘a noble mind 
untouched by any real distress, practicing spiritual massage in an ivory tower’ could imagine 
suffering as a means of maturing (203). The final failed attempt at an answer is dealt with 
even more briefly. Is suffering ‘a pointer to another, eternal life’?42  Certainly, he responds, 
Christians hope ‘for eternal life without death, pain, and tears,’ but on the other hand, ‘no 
one can prove that this suffering is the absolutely necessary means for attaining eternal life,’ 
and indeed ‘a crudely understood future state of happiness does not justify the horrors that 
preceded it.’43  
We have a rapid tour, then, of potential theodicies, and a forceful rejection of each 
of them. But once again, in Rahner’s final section, we encounter a kind of flip, a reversal: we 
cannot say why God allows this terrible suffering, but the very-not-being-able-to-say can be 
united with that which is highest in our life, our relation to the mystery of God: ‘The 
incomprehensibility of suffering is part of the incomprehensibility of God…the very fact that 
it is really and eternally incomprehensible means that suffering is truly a manifestation of 
                                                     
40 Karl Rahner, ‘Why does God allow us to suffer?’ in Theological Investigations 19 (London: Darton, Longman and Todd 
Ltd, 1984), 199. 
41 Ibid., 202. 
42 Ibid., 204. 
43 Ibid., 204, 205. 
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God’s incomprehensibility in his nature and in his freedom…Suffering, then, is the form…in 
which the incomprehensibility of God himself appears…the acceptance of God as the 
intractable mystery and the silent acceptance of the inexplicability and unanswerability of 
suffering are one and the same event’44. In a final passage, Rahner cites a story that Romano 
Guardini on his deathbed spoke of the question he would like to ask at the Last Judgment-- 
‘Why, God, these fearful detours on the way to salvation, the suffering of the innocent, why 
sin?’. Guardini was, according to Rahner, right to be unable to answer the question himself, 
and beyond this, Rahner suggests (going well beyond Guardini’s own position, it seems), 
even at the Last Judgment Guardini could expect, as answer ‘only the incomprehensible God 
in his freedom and nothing else.’45 
If  Weil seems to offer us, by bringing the very worst together with the very best, a 
terrifying valorization of suffering, Rahner seems to offer an equally terrifying 
reinterpretation of what it means to have faith in a loving God—at least in this essay, he has 
made our submission to the incomprehensibility of God so profound that we can no longer 
have, it seems, even the slightest idea of what love might mean.46  
IV 
What does all this have to do with the theme of our symposium? What does it have 
to do, in particular, with political theology? 
To answer this, it will be helpful to turn to two familiar political critiques of 
Christianity. First, there is the question of the sacralisation of suffering.  Christianity teaches 
its adherents to make their peace with misery, to view suffering as divinely sanctioned and 
redemptive, to embrace it, so the objection goes, and in doing so exerts a brake on the 
movement towards human betterment. And then there is, secondly, eschatology: even if 
the suffering of this life is understood as a genuine evil, in promising something better in a 
distant future, pie in the sky when you die, Christian faith reconciles its followers to the 
world order and saps motivation for emancipation.   
 In the preceding sections I have focused on issues related to the first of these 
worries: the danger of making sense of suffering when one ought not. The inclination to 
                                                     
44 Ibid., 205-7. 
45 Ibid., 208.  
46 Though I will not attempt to make the argument for it here, I think this essay, which Rahner wrote quite late in life, need 
not be read as representing the deepest centre of his theological vision, but can be seen as something closer to an error on 
his part. For the purposes of my argument, however, what is interesting is that it seems such an enticing error, an easy 
error to fall into.  
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avert one’s attention from a suffering which one cannot quickly alleviate, to narrate the 
world in such a way as to make one’s peace with the suffering of others, is of course not 
only a temptation for Christian believers. But it is a temptation which can manifest itself 
quite powerfully and distinctively in an ecclesial context, and, I have tried to show, which 
makes itself felt in a variety of ways on a theoretical as well as a practical level. It is difficult 
to maintain an ‘apophatic,’ unreconciled stance towards suffering, then, and even when one 
does, there seems to be a final temptation to once again—but on a higher level-- quietly 
come to terms with suffering, by somehow merging what one might call the ‘darkness of 
suffering’ into the ‘darkness of God’.  
 If maintaining a genuinely unknowing, unresolved stance towards suffering is so 
difficult, if there are so many ways in which we seem to be tempted to evade it, what might 
enable such a stance, and allow us to sustain it? What might make it possible? A full answer 
would of course have many levels and is beyond the scope of this paper.47 But for some 
indication of the beginning of an answer, it seems to me useful to return to the second of 
the stock political worries about Christianity, the pie-in-the-sky-when-you-die worry. I’d like 
to propose that if one tries to avoid this altogether—if one pulls back from any sort of 
future-oriented eschatology—then a proper apophasis before suffering cannot in fact be a 
real possibility for Christian theology. 
 To be capable of attending to suffering without improper evasion, in other words, 
Christian theology needs to maintain a future-oriented eschatology, a real eschatological 
hope. It does not have to be a detailed and imaginatively full eschatology. In fact, it cannot 
be: to have a richly imagined eschatology, a concrete depiction of what it might be that 
would allow us to say that all things are well, would once again entail a failure in the proper 
‘apophatic’ stance before suffering.48 But if theology is not to slide into a positive valuation 
                                                     
47 The partial answer I will offer here is one naturally favoured by a systematic theologian-- others might well begin 
elsewhere. I have been told, for instance, and found it entirely plausible, that those who can attend to the suffering of 
others without evasion are those who have in fact ‘processed’ their own suffering. Or again, one might, as does Rowan 
Williams in The Tragic Imagination, point to tragic drama as an art form which serves as a kind of training, disciplines an 
audience to ‘contemplate’ suffering, to attend to pain which it cannot heal.   
48 I have argued for this point, against John Thiel’s Icons of Hope: The “Last Things” in Catholic Imagination (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), in ‘Eschatology, Suffering and the Limits of Theology’. Thiel explicitly rejects 
apophasis in eschatology, arguing instead that we are obliged to ‘imagine seriously and to describe with some measure of 
coherence’ the last things (22). Strictly speaking there is no reason to rule out a rich use of the imagination in eschatology, 
if that is understood as the imaginative generation of a profusion of possibly contradictory, inconsistent images. This seems 
to be what we find in Scripture, and it can be understood precisely as the cataphatic counterpart to eschatological 
apophasis. But to imagine a coherent eschatology, such that one could see how it can turn out to be the case that all will be 
well, and all manner of things will be well, is, I argue in ‘Suffering and Eschatology,’ to put ourselves into the wrong 
relationship to suffering. 
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of suffering, it needs to maintain a genuine hope that there is a time –however impossible 
to imagine-- when what has been promised in the resurrection will be made good, when 
‘every tear will be wiped away,’ when ‘all shall be well and all shall be well and all manner of 
thing shall be well.’49 There must be a hope for a world radically different from what we 
now see and know. It might be objected, of course, that to hold on to such a hope is itself to 
reconcile oneself to suffering, but I do not think this is necessarily so.   It is possible, and 
important, to distinguish between being reconciled, and hoping that there will be 
reconciliation.50 
 Christianity cannot, in other words, escape both standard political critiques at the 
same time. Suffering exerts a kind of pressure on the system which does now allow this. A 
fully ‘realised’ eschatology will neatly block one line of objection, but it will also, I am 
suggesting, be accompanied by some form of mystification of suffering and death. If we are 
too bashful in our eschatology, then, too set on disciplining ourselves against the ‘escapism’ 
of a future oriented eschatology, we will pay a political price at another point in our 
thinking-- we will have to find a way to look at things so as to persuade ourselves that 
suffering is not, in the end, when you come down to it, if you can look at it in just the right 





                                                     
49 While proper engagement with Rowan Williams The Tragic Imagination would require a longer paper, it is perhaps worth 
mentioning that to my taste, the role of such eschatological hope in Chapter 5 of this book seems too weak. Williams, 
following Donald MacKinnon, is concerned to insist that Christian theology is able to take suffering seriously; this includes 
not needing ‘to suppose that suffering is cancelled or even compensated by the hope of ultimate reconciliation’. On the 
other hand, Christianity does not affirm an ‘absolute tragedy.’ What, then, stands between the Christian vision and 
absolute tragedy? It is, if I understand Williams right, ‘the possibility of mourning—the articulation of loss…’ (124).   
50 As David Newheiser has reminded me, much here depends on exactly how hope is understood.  
